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BOOK REVIEWS
THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON. Edited by Julius
Goebel, Jr., and others. Volume I. New York: Columbia University
Press. 1964. Pp. xxiv, 898. $18.50.
When Alexander Hamilton returned home from the Revolutionary
War in 1782, he set a pattern since followed by a good many other vet-
erans, dividing his time between rocking the cradle and studying law.' In
July 1782, he was admitted to practice in New York, and less than two
years later he could report to Gouverneur Morris that "a legislative folly
has afforded so plentiful a harvest to us lawyers that we have scarcely a
moment to spare from the substantial business of reaping."2  More of
the "legislative folly" and the "so plentiful a harvest" in a moment. For
present purposes it is enough to note that from the beginning of his study
in 1782 until his senseless "interview" with Aaron Burr twenty-two years
later, Alexander Hamilton was, to the extent that his other responsibilities
permitted, heavily involved in the practice of law.'
This involvement has been a matter of profound and continuing
consequence to the Republic. It is therefore, as the editor of this book
rather modestly asserts, "something of an event in the annals of our pro-
fession" that the trustees of the William Nelson Cromwell Foundation
should initiate "this documentary reconstruction" of Hamilton's profes-
sional career.4 Moreover, the editor virtually promises us additional
volumes. In this connection it is well to recall that those preparing the
definitive edition of Hamilton's writings have relinquished to Professor
Goebel the "legal papers."5  This resolution of what can be seen to be a
most formidable editorial problem' is, from one standpoint, regrettable.
It would certainly be convenient for Hamilton scholars to have available
1. "I have been employed for the last ten months in rocking the cradle and studying
the art of fleecing my neighbors." Letter from Hamilton to Lafayette, Nov. 3, 1782, in
3 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 192 (Syrett ed. 1962).
2. Letter from Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris, Feb. 21, 1784. Id. at 512.
3. Cf. Corwin, Janes Madison: Laynai, Publicist and Exegete, 27 N.Y.U.L. REV.
277 (1952).
4. 1 THE LAw PRAcTIcE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON iX (Goebel ed. 1964) [herein-
after cited as GoaEBE].
5. 3 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAmILTON v (Syrett ed. 1962).
6. The expedient adopted raises other problems. Illustrative is the problem of what
to do with the two Letters from Phocion, id. at 483-97, 530-58, which bear directly on
Rutgers v. Waddington and the War Cases. We get only a few quoted excerpts in the
volume under review, and the Papers, as indicated, get the complete text.
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in one set of books Hamilton's writings. But the decision to have two
sets does have its advantages, as this book makes abundantly clear.
The chief of these advantages is that Professor Goebel and his asso-
ciates have been able to achieve a great deal more than a "documentary
reconstruction" of Hamilton's professional career. They have been able
to govern themselves by the generous notion that whatever will enable
the reader better to understand Hamilton's career at the Bar could fairly
be included in this volume. We thus have much material here of no
unique relevance to Hamilton. We have, for example, an opening sec-
tion of thirty-five pages, entitled "Law and the Judicial Scene," which
takes us through the maze of New York's colonial and post-revolutionary
courts. And we are given something like a transcript (it is obviously in-
complete) of the proceedings in a murder case in which Hamilton, along
with Aaron Burr and Brockholst Livingston, served as counsel for the
defendant.' But there is hardly a single contribution of Hamilton to the
prisoner's defense that is identifiable. Similarly, in the section on "Prac-
tice and Procedure," we have reproduced for us twenty-nine procedural
documents of which only six can be attributed to Hamilton or a case with
which he was connected.' I neither protest nor regret the inclusion of
these materials. Indeed, I am grateful for them. I merely wish to point
out that a good deal of this book has no more to do with Hamilton than
it does, say, with Brockholst Livingston or with any other New York
lawyer in the years following the Revolution. One result is that we have
one of the clearest and liveliest pictures yet available of law practice in
eighteenth-century America.
Let me quickly add that for all the wealth of background material,
the editors have not forgotten their central commitment. We are enabled
to see Alexander Hamilton as lawyer in far sharper focus and more in-
timately than ever before. In this the editors have been aided by docu-
ments from Hamilton himself, many never before printed. By all odds
the most noteworthy of these is Hamilton's practice manual, Practical
Proceedings in the Supreme Court of New York.9 While this work is
hardly of the magnitude of those recently published from the pen of an-
other eighteenth-century lawyer,1" still the editors claim for it the distinc-
tion of being the first treatise in the field of private law by one of our
great lawyers. The date of this treatise is uncertain, but the editors argue,
convincingly I think, for the first part of 1782, when Hamilton was
7. GoEBEL at 704-74.
8. Id. at 136-66.
9. Id. at 55-135.
10. James Boswell. Of the many volumes available for citation, see particularly
BoswELL FOR THE DEFENSE (Wimsatt ed. 1959).
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studying for the Bar. At any rate, it abounds in interest, both for what
it has to say about the law in eighteenth-century New York and for what
it tells of Hamilton the lawyer. It is, despite its antique idiom, modern in
temper and liberal in tone. For example, concerning pleas in abatement,
Hamilton remarks:
Formerly there was a great deal of nice Learning... which is
now in Little Estimation and indeed the Pleas themselves are
seldom used; and are always discountenanced by the Court,
which having lately acquired a more liberal Cast begin to have
some faint Idea that the end of Suits at Law is to Investigate
the Merits of the Cause, and not to entangle in the Nets of
technical Terms."
Closely allied to the "liberal Cast" here displayed is Hamilton's con-
stant search in his treatise for reason in the law. He looks for the rea-
sons behind the rules he collects, and when he can find none, he says so.'"
He complains of the rule disqualifying a witness for interest as excluding
those most knowledgeable.' 3  He believes that courts should just as read-
ily grant new trials for inadequate damages as for excessive damages,'4
and he disapproves the necessity of a second action for mesne profits
after an ejectment.1"
In Practical Proceedings, we see Hamilton in the role of student. In
the other sections of this book, we see him as counsellor and advocate as
well. There is a substantial section devoted to Hamilton's work as coun-
sel in the Western lands dispute, a dispute still alive in 1926.16 There is
also a section on criminal cases where the principal item of interest is
Hamilton's argument in the well-known case of People v. Croswell, in
which Hamilton contributed so largely to the establishment of truth as a
defense in libel actions. James Kent, one of the judges, took notes on
11. GoEBF.r at 81.
12. See, e.g., id. at 122-23, where Hamilton confesses puzzlement at a rule denying
that choses in action can be the subject of a release. The editors come forward with a
superb note indicating that Hamilton had not stated the rule correctly and pointing out
how the available sources probably were responsible for his error. There is instance
after instance of comparable thoroughness on the part of the editors, particularly in
their handling of Practical Proceedings.
Further on the subject of releases, Hamilton is surely right when he declares:
"The most effectual Release is by Writing under Seal, by which the Releasor, 'remises
Releases and quits Claim to all Actions, Suits, Debts, Dues and Demands whatsoever,
from the Beginning of the World to the present Day." GoEBEL at 121.
13. Id. at 95.
14. Id. at 120. Cf. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1934).
15. Gonru. at 131.
16. Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65 (1926).
17. 3 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 337 (1804).
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Hamilton's argument, and we can see in them a reflection of an advocate
of hypnotic power. The argument, Kent reports, "was probably never
surpassed."'3 Far and away the largest section is that devoted to the War
Cases, from which Hamilton reaped his "so plentiful a harvest" and not
exclusively to his own benefit, but, to this day, to that of the Republic
as well.
The War Cases involved the harassed Loyalists caught in the toils of
the measures of the New York legislature taken against them at the time
of and after the Revolution. The first such measure was the Confiscation
Act,19 forfeiting, after a supposed judicial proceeding, the property of
those adhering to the enemy. The second, the Citation Act," was de-
signed to relieve patriots of their debts to those who remained in the ter-
ritory under British occupation. The third, the Trespass Act,2 passed in
1783, created a new brand of trespass and took from those who occupied
patriot property during the occupation the defense of having done so
under an order or command of the "enemy."
Writing in 1795, Hamilton tells us in respect to the Trespass Act
that "a general opinion was entertained embracing almost our whole bar
as well as the public that it was useless to attempt a defence and ac-
cordingly . . .many compromises were made and large sums paid under
the despair of a successful defence .. "22 Hamilton knew along with
all others concerned that the treaty of peace with Great Britain, if hon-
ored, provided a defense. But he alone had the courage and resourceful-
ness to make an effective demand that the treaty be honored. He could
fairly claim: "I was for a long time the only practicer who pursued a
different course and opposed the Treaty to the Act. . .
The vehicle of his demand was, of course, the famous case in 1784
of Rutgers v. Waddington.24 The resort of Hamilton to national law
(THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION and the peace treaty) to protect his
client Waddington from the widow Rutgers and the Trespass Act un-
mistakably pointed the way to a national law operative on individuals.
Just as unmistakably it pointed to the supremacy of national law over
18. GOEBEL at 839 (emphasis in the original).
19. N.Y. Laws, 1779, ch. 25.
20. N.Y. Laws, 1782, ch. 1.
21. N.Y. Laws, 1783, ch. 31.
22. Extract from draft of a letter to George Washington, July 9-10, 1795. GOEBEL
at 541.
23. Ibid.
24. ARGUMENTS AND JUDGMENT OF THE MAYOR'S COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
IN A CAUSE BETWEEN ELIZABETH RUTGERS AND JOSHUA WADDINGTON (New York 1784),
printed here. GOEBEL at 393.
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state law and its binding force on state judges.2" And unquestionably the
argument contributed to the doctrine of judicial review. All of this we
have known for quite a long time. Indeed, from the moment of its ut-
terance in 1784, the argument and its implications have been a part of
our national consciousness." What is new here is that the editors gather
together for the first time all of the documentary materials now available
relating not only to Rutgers v. Waddington but to all the other sixty-odd
cases in which Hamilton was employed by beleaguered Loyalists. In their
variety, these materials are admirably suited to the editors' purpose. We
have pleadings of all sorts, procedural parries and thrusts, petitions for
relief as a matter of grace, research notes, opinion letters, and the im-
portunities of clients. From the materials and from the editors' skillful
presentation of them, there emerges a picture of Hamilton as lawyer pul-
sating with life.
Generally, the editors have discharged their immensely demanding
assignment in a manner beyond praise. They have spared no effort nor
any archivist. Where commentary is needed to make a difficult text in-
telligible, they have supplied it. They have approached their task with a
discriminating imagination based on solid learning. This is not to say
that they invariably please" or do not on occasion mislead. Of the latter,
I shall mention only the most grievous instance. In less than four pages,28
the editors assertively and dogmatically dispose of the existence of a fed-
25. In his "notes for argument," Hamilton put the point this way: "Judges of each
state must of necessity be judges of United States." Id. at 351.
26. For both the immediate influence and the enduring importance of Hamilton's
argument, see Corwin, Progress of Constitutional Theory between the Declaration of In-
dependence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 Am. HisT. REv. 511, 529-
31 (1925).
We have no text of the argument as delivered, but ever since 1910, when Allan
McLane Hamilton published his Intimate Life of his grandfather, we have had in print
two drafts of Hamilton's "notes for argument." ALLAN McLANE HAMILTON, THE IN-
TIMATE LIFE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 457 (1910). Scholars have been aware of the
existence of a much more comprehensive draft in the library at Hamilton College. Ros-
SITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITuTION 306 (1964). Moreover, since 1784
there has been the opinion of the mayor's court, which recites much of the argument.
In addition to the mayor's court opinion and the two documents published by Allan
McLane Hamilton, the editors present here the Hamilton College draft and two other
drafts plus a brief procedural memorandum. Happily, the editors follow the example of
Allan McLane Hamilton in their manner of presentation, striving as nearly as the e-x-
igencies of printing will permit, to reproduce the documents as they are. We thus have
all the deletions, interlineations, marginal notes, and even Hamilton's signal for empha-
sis-a hand with the forefinger pointing to the words to be emphasized.
27. Hamilton once wrote: "In law as in Religion the Letter kills. The Spirit
makes alive." GoauL at 391. With a caution that excites wonderment even in this non-
Bible reading age, the editors remark: "The inspiration for this aphorism is apparently
II Corinthians 3:6. .. " GommE. at 335. There are a few other comments equally timid
and equally banal.
28. Id. at 3-35.
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eral common law and of the interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 17899 as well. As to section 34, even the muse of the Erie priest-
hood confesses difficulty and goes so far as to assert that Professor
Crosskey is "persuasive" in his approach to the significance of Charles
Warren's discoveries." But whatever occasional fault this book may
have, it is certain to be essential to an understanding and appreciation of
Alexander Hamilton.
FRANCIS PASCHALt
JUSTICE RUTLEDGE AND THE BRIGHT CONSTELLATION. By Fowler
V. Harper, introduction by Irving Brant. Indianapolis and New York:
Bobbs-Merrill. 1965. Pp. xxv, 406. $6.95.
It was the nation's misfortune, as well as his own, that Wiley B.
Rutledge served for so short a time on the Supreme Court bench. The
six-year span from 1943 to 1949 was hardly long enough to project a
widely recognized public image; it is reasonable to speculate that, had
he lived to twice that length of time on the bench, the matured philosophy
which he brought from a lifetime of teaching might have accelerated the
forces which, half a dozen years later, ushered in the present epochal se-
quence of constitutional decisions. Rutledge was the last of the appointees
of Franklin D. Roosevelt; the first, Mr. Justice Black, has enjoyed a
tenure of sufficient length to epitomize the judicial function as F.D.R.
presumably envisioned it-although another early F.D.R. appointee, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, remained long enough to undergo a jurisprudential
sea-change.
In any event, Mr. Justice Rutledge bolstered a core of constitutional
liberals among whom could be counted Black, Robert H. Jackson, and
William 0. Douglas, supported with fair consistency by Mr. Chief Justice
Stone and Frank Murphy. In the very heart of the second World War,
President Roosevelt at last had his ideological majority of men who were
aware, if the war itself had not been a reminder, that a far more complex
economic and social fabric was in the making. The simple truths of a
frontier society had not been refuted so much as they had become irrele-
vant; to find new constitutional propositions consistent with the past but
29. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
30. Friendly, It Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.
U.L. REv. 383, 389 (1964).
t Professor of Lav, Duke University.
